

## Article 1

[6161] Title. Whether Food Enters into the Truth of Human Nature

Argument 1. The first argument proceeds as follows: It appears that food does not enter into the truth of human nature. For whatever is taken in and later excreted, does not pertain to the truth of human nature, which always remains the same. But everything which enters by the mouth, passes through the stomach, and later is excreted, as it says in Matthew 15. Therefore the nutrients which are taken in by the mouth, do not enter into the truth of human nature.

[6163] Argument 2. Secondly, the truth of any given thing is in that which is considered as its species. But that which enters by way of nutrition, is considered as matter, as is stated in On Generation and Corruption, II. But flesh which is considered as matter does not become flesh considered as species, as is clear from "On Coming to Be" Physics IV. Therefore food does not enter into the truth of human nature.

[6164] Argument 3. Thirdly, that pertains to the truth of human nature is rooted in that which requires heat. But a wet thing of this sort, as physicians state, is not restored once it is consumed, as is clear from those things which produce the third species of wasting disease, which is incurable, because of the fact that this wetness is not restored. Since, therefore, all that into which food is converted can be restored after consumption, it appears that food is not changed into that which properly belongs to the truth of human nature.

[6165] Argument 4. Fourthly, all that into which food is converted, is also forthwith dissolved by the agent heat, so that that which flows and that which reflows are adjudged the same. But it cannot be that all that which is in the body be in flux, as will be proven. Therefore it is necessary that something remain in the body, into which the food is not converted. But this particularly pertains to the truth of human nature. Therefore food does not change into that which per se is of the truth of human nature. Proof of the minor. If it were not the case that something remained fixed in the human body, then it would happen that any part of it could disappear, with any other thing being substituted in its place; and for the same reason the same would happen for the whole, just as with any of its parts. Thus it would happen that, of that matter which first was present in the body of any man, none will not remain at his end. But the distinction of the individual derives from the distinction of matter. Ergo it would not be the same man at the end of his life as at the beginning, which is absurd.

[6166] Argument 5. Fifthly, no natural virtue is weakened by a multiplying of the matter which is proper to it: but only by the admixture of something extraneous. But the ability to convert [food] becomes weaker in the human being at the end of his life; were it otherwise, a man could live and grow forever. Therefore this happens due to an admixture of something extraneous. But nothing is mixed with that matter in which the ability to convert is first founded, but only with that which is generated from food. Therefore, that which is generated from food is extraneous to that in which the truth of nature is founded, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

[6167] Argument 6. Sixthly, nature does any given thing in the easiest way in which it can come to be. God, however, operates in a much more ordered manner than does nature. An easier way of augmenting something would be by multiplication of its matter, rather than by conversion of something else into that is being made. Thus, it seems that this manner of divine providence is appropriate, such that the human body should increase not by anything exterior coming into it, but only by its own matter increasing; and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

[6168] Argument 7. Seventhly, those things which are of one species, achieve their completion for the same reason. But some dead infants will be brought into the resurrection in their complete quantity, not due to the multiplication of

nutrition but by multiplication of matter. Therefore, in the same way other men will also be brought to their complete quantity, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

[6169] Sed contra 1. But on the contrary, according to the Philosopher in "On Coming to Be" 50, nothing nourishes flesh except that which is potentially flesh. But all that which is in potency to something, changes into it by the action of that which is in act. Therefore food is changed into that flesh which pertains to true [human] nature.

[6170] Sed contra 2. And further, nourishment in the beginning is dissimilar, but at the end it is similar: since nothing is nourished and maintained except by that which is similar. But those things are similar which share in the same form. Since, therefore, the truth of nature is due to form, it seems that that which nourishes, conduces in the end to the true nature of the same nourished thing.

[6171] Response. I respond by saying that concerning this issue there are many opinions. Some state, as the Master is seen to believe in his writings, that that which is detached from the parents is that in which the truth of the born man consists. But this is entirely preserved as it grows to have a larger quantity; such that nothing is added to it so that it might receive a larger quantity; but rather the entire quantity of the complete man is achieved by multiplication of that matter: and they say that it is only this which will arise again at the resurrection; but the rest will be discarded as superfluous. And they also say that while the taking of nutrients is necessary, it is certainly not for growth, as the nutritive virtue serves the augmentative, and again it is not for the restoration of what is lost, but only for the kindling of natural heat, just as when gold is liquified, and lead is added, the gold is not consumed, but only the lead.

But this position is seen to be irrational for two reasons. Specifically, concerning that which grows, and concerning the food which is taken in. For growth cannot come about, except in this fashion: the matter which is first limited to small dimensions is later induced into larger dimensions. But this can only come about in two ways: either it will be of the same matter both under large dimensions as well as under small ones; and such a change from small to large necessarily comes about by rarefaction: for dense and rare differ in this: in the rare there is little matter under large dimensions, and in the dense there is much matter under small dimensions, as is clear from Physics IV. Or else there will be more matter under large dimensions than under small ones. But this cannot happen, unless either new matter is created de novo, or else that which was matter of another body is made to be matter for that being into whose body the matter is transmuted. And thus also Augustine, in "On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis", Book 10 says, that nothing is more absurd than to posit there to be any body which grows in all directions, while the quantity of its nature remains the same, unless it rarifies, since nothing makes a body grow unless it is via addition or rarefaction.

But it is clear that growth of the human body does not occur via rarefaction: and again it does not occur via matter created de novo, because God created all matter simultaneously, as the saints state. It thus remains that the growth of the human body occurs by the addition of matter that was formerly under the form of another body, with that body being truly converted into the human body: and this is nourishment. And the statement of Augustine cannot be adduced against this position, as some state, because he is speaking according to the common manner by which things grow: because in this way his proof against Tertullian would not be valid, who proposed that the soul would grow, but would not be diminished in any way. But the manner in which the human body grows is more common than that by which the soul would grow, For even according to Tertullian, the soul will grow at the same time the body grows.

And again, neither can it be said, as some say, that the meaning of the phrase "with its quantity remaining the same" would have the following sense: the body

remaining in its quantity, such that its quantity would not be augmented either by addition nor by multiplication, it would not grow except by rarefaction. Since, therefore, growth is proper to quantity, it cannot be understood that the body would grow, while its quantity remained the same in dimension; rather it must be understood to say that, with the quantity of its nature remaining, such that no quantity be added, either of that which is of its same nature, as gold is added to gold, or of that which would accept the same nature in its own conjunction, as food is added to flesh. Thus, in this which is said [by Augustine]: "with the same quantity of its nature remaining," nothing is eliminated except the addition of something similar in nature. For if he were to intend to eliminate multiplication, then his proof would not be worth anything: because it can be stated with much more probability that, if the soul were to be body, that it would grow by the multiplication that they posit, than if it were stated of the human body, because it is more spiritual.

But in regards to that which is added, it also is clearly a falsity: because if the uptake of food were not per se intended by nature, but [occurred] merely by accident, as i.e. when something harmful happens to somebody, as by the transfer of natural heat, and if the transformation of food were not per se necessary to the human body, then the heat which converts would be superfluous: and thus in the operations of nature instituted by God many superfluous things would occur.

Nevertheless those who sustain this position come to their assertion in three ways, each of which is easy to refute. For some indeed say that this sort of multiplication occurs by a miraculous divine operation, as the the bread was multiplied for the evangelists, as stated in John 6. But this statement contains a falsehood, since it converts the work of nature into a miracle. And further also, in the multiplication of those loaves of bread it is not optional, but rather is strictly necessary, that the addition of matter be produced by the conversion of another body into loaves of bread by the divine power. But nature can perform this conversion of food into true flesh, by converting that which is in potency into that which is in act; although it performs over time that which God performs instantaneously. But that which is possible for nature, has been entrusted by God to the operation of nature, who gives to each thing a perfection according to its capacity; and thus it is not necessary to have recourse to a miracle.

Others say that because in the human body there is a great deal of the fifth element, the multiplication of the human body occurs according to how much the fifth element is multiplied; thus, just as the light of the sun is multiplied by being diffused throughout the air, in the same way the human body grows too, without the addition of anything extrinsic. But this proposal contains two falsities. The first is that the fifth essence does not enter into the composition of the human body, except according to its virtue only: since it is neither combinable with anything, nor divisible, nor can it be outside its proper place. The second falsity is that the diffusion of light does not occur by the multiplication of any matter, since light is not a body, but is a multiplication of form only, just as is also the case in any alteration or generation, since the agent multiplies its own form in matter.

Others, however, approach the issue in another way: for they say that prime matter, as it is in itself, lacks all quantity and form; therefore it is able to receive all quantities, just as it able to receive all forms. Since any given small thing would be made of prime matter in some sort of small body, it can receive any quantity whatsoever; indeed, they say that from a grain of millet a whole world could come to be. Nonetheless it would be marvelous, that from punctual material a whole world could be made; for since matter lacks quantity it is indivisible, and exists in the manner of a point.

But this way of solving the problem is deficient in several ways. First, because the indivisibility of matter is being imagined in the manner of a point, as though the world were to be produced from matter by some kind of extension, just as though a small thing were to be stretched into a great size. But this is not true. For matter is said to be indivisible through negation of all genera of

quantity. But a point is indivisible insofar as it is a principle of quantity, having a determinate place. Thus from matter a thing is made into a quanta, not by extension (speaking of prime matter) since extension does not exist except as pertaining to that which is of some quantity; rather [a thing is made into a quanta] by the taking on of a quantity. Secondly, although prime matter, considered in itself, does not have any quantity, nevertheless it does not follow that it would be in potency in regards to any imaginable quantity. For since determined quantities, and all other accidents, receive matter according to the requirements of form, such that underlying matter with form is the cause of those things which are in it, as is stated in Physics I, it is necessary that prime matter be in potency to no quantity, except those which correspond to natural forms, which can be in matter. But prime matter is not in potency to other forms besides those which are in the nature of things, or which can be educed by natural principles. For if there were some passive potency in matter to which there did not respond some active potency in the nature of things, that passive potency would be superfluous, as the Commentator says: and thus prime matter is not receptive of a greater quantity than the quantity of the world, according to what is stated in Physics III, because it is not possible to increase a magnitude infinitely, speaking naturally.

Third, because if the same matter which is first under small dimensions, were to be made to be under larger dimensions, this could not occur except by rarefaction, as has been stated: and this manner [of increase] does not correspond to the growth of the human body, as is clear per se.

Fourth, because when we speak of the matter existing in this thing, we are already abandoning the absolute consideration of matter: for the matter which is in this thing cannot be treated of, except insofar as it is divided from that part of matter which is in another thing. But division does not happen to matter, except as it is considered under dimensions without determination, at any rate: because with quantity abstracted away, as is stated in Physics I, substance will be indivisible. Thus the consideration of the matter of this thing is a consideration which is not of matter taken absolutely, but rather of matter existing under dimension. But it is not necessary that that which pertains to matter insofar as it is absolute and prime, must pertain also to the matter existing in this thing, insofar as it is taken as existing in this thing: because the very thing itself is eliminated by the consideration of prime matter. Thus the matter which is existing in this thing is not in potency to all the quantity of the world, but only to a determined amount, i.e. as much as can be obtained by rarefaction; and this does not exceed the rarity of fire; because no rarity can be greater, as the Commentator states regarding Physics IV. And thus it is clear that this position both contains falsity in itself, and also in the manner of approaching its exposition.

And this is the position of the others, who indeed concede along with the former thinkers that something is in the human body, and similarly in other bodies which are nourished, which always remains fixed over the entire course of life, as a determined part of matter (in which they say that the truth of human nature principally consists): but whatever is superfluous and in flux [refluit] is other; i.e. that which comes into the body and is consumed: but this is what is generated from food. Nevertheless, these thinkers differ from the former in that they accept that food is not only necessary for the generation of natural heat, but also for growth in size: for that which is first received from the parents cannot be taken away (because, indeed, they say it is permanent), either in the quantity of extension, or as a quantity of the human body is, unless some matter is added, which would be simultaneously received along with the total pre-existing quantity of matter, without any rarefaction. And indeed this, which is permanent, they say to be diffused throughout the whole body, and similarly for that which is taken in and excreted, as happens with the mixture of water and wine; for wine does not grow into a larger quantity except by the addition of water, which is indeed converted into wine; similarly it is nevertheless the case that the virtue of wine always remains in that part of the matter which formerly existed under the form of wine. And according to what these thinkers state, that which is generated from food is not entirely alien to the truth of

human nature, as the former thinkers said; but it pertains to [the truth of human nature] secondarily, insofar as it is necessary for the complementing of necessary quantity; thus not all that which is converted from food will be removed in the resurrection, but there will be retained just so much as is necessary for the perfection of quantity. And the first author of this kind of position happened to be Alexander the Commentator, as Averroes states in his Commentary on "On Coming to Be and Passing Away."

But this position does not appear to be true; for, given that fluid is consumed by the nature of heat (I am speaking of the heat of fire), it is necessary that the heat of fire, which is an instrument for the vegetable soul, as is stated in On the Soul II, indifferently consume that which is humid in itself; thus there cannot be discovered an effective explanation by which some signate wetness would remain throughout the entire life. And next, according to this position, the intake of food would not be primarily and per se necessary for the restoration of what is lost, but only for increase. Nevertheless it is clear that the operation of growth presupposes the operation of nutrition, and only that is nourished in which the loss occurred of that which is restored by nourishment; thus if there were no consumption except of that which is principally assumed for growth, nutrition would not be anything other than growth.

And next it can be conceded that that which is converted into flesh by the formative virtue in the principle of generation, leads to a greater perfection of the species than that which is later converted by the act of the nutritive virtue; since generation always occurs for something which is generated per se, it is more perfect than that virtue by which something takes on a species of something by admixture with it: because that which is intermixed in some way alters the nature of that to which it is admixed, as is clear in the wine which is generated in the grape must, and which grows by the admixture of water to the wine. And thus we also see that from the nourishing heat which is taken in, the nourished body is changed so as to achieve in some regard the conditions of the foods from which it is nourished. For this, nevertheless, it is necessary that there be nutrition or growth, because this portion of flesh which is generated from food is mixed with pre-existing flesh. But whenever there occurs a mixture of different things, either according to contrary quality or according their purity or impurity, the complete mixture does not retain every proper quality: otherwise there would be admixture of things retained, and would merely be composition: but it must be the case that the whole simultaneously takes on a single form, which is an intermediate, as is clear in the mixture of wine and water: because after the mixture there does not remain any signate part which has the complete virtue of wine, but something has [the virtue] more weakly; but the whole has [the virtue] in a lesser way; thus it is not possible, once the act of the nutritive and growth virtues has been completed, that there remain anything signate which completely participates in the nature of the species, and something else [which participates] incompletely; but the whole [must participate] uniformly.

And they also assume in their assertion of their opinion a distinction of philosophy concerning flesh according as it is species and as it is matter, and [a distinction] of medical things concerning nourishing humor and "radical humor". But because neither of these would work for them, it will be made clear in the response to the arguments. The third position is that which Averroes posits in his Commentary on "On Coming to Be", Book I, saying that no matter can be taken into a signate body, because it is fixed and permanent; but whatsoever is whole in the body, can be considered in two ways: either as matter, and thus does not remain; or as form and species, and thus it is permanent. For Aristotle compares, in Book I of "On Coming to Be", the transmutation of food into flesh to the burning of logs. For we see that if fire is kindled, and logs are continually added as the earlier logs are consumed, the form of fire always remains in the wood; but nevertheless for whatever matter is consumed, other matter succeeds it, in which the species of fire is preserved: and in this way, also that which pertains to the species and form of flesh always will remain; although that which receives this form is continually consumed and restored. But

this position differs from the two earlier ones in that it does not posit that something of matter could be indicated which always remains; but any given signate part, because of that which is matter in it, contains that which in flux; while, nevertheless, that which is of the form always remains. The earlier of these positions, however, posited that something signate of the matter is always permanent, in which primarily and principally human truth would consist.

And also it differs in that the first opinion posited that food is in no way converted into the truth of nature; the second, however, posited that indeed it would be converted into that which is secondarily of the truth of human nature, but not into that which is primarily so; but this third position posits that it be converted into that which is simply and primarily of the truth of human nature; for although that which is first converted into flesh would be more perfectly assimilated to the species of flesh than that which is added from food; nevertheless, with the intake of food, at the end of digestion there would be an admixture, so that the whole would uniformly take on the truth of the species without any distinction; and for this reason, also, it is clear that it must be the case that in the resurrection both that which is added due to food will resurrect, as well as that which pertains to the completion of required quantity. And I assent more to this position amongst all of the positions, without prejudging others.

[6172] Ad 1. In regards to the first argument, I state that from this authority it cannot be asserted that from that from which is taken in through the mouth, nothing remains which is changed into true flesh: because in this statement, "all" does not indicate the integral whole, but rather the whole in regards to quantity; thus it is not necessary that the whole be discharged through succession, but rather that from any given thing something other should succeed: and this is necessary, because it must be the case that a separation between pure and impure come about: but no food is taken into that in which there need not be anything of impurity, from that which at the beginning was dissimilar; thus if it must be reduced to a similitude, those parts which made them dissimilar must be taken away. For example, if in the food there dominates the earthy parts more than in that which is being nourished, the earthy part must be removed, and that which is more subtle will be taken in: and also similarly whatever parts are more dominant.

[6173] Ad 2. In regards to the second argument, it must be said that according to the third opinion flesh is not diverse according to distinct matter, in that which is said to be flesh according to matter, and that which is flesh according to species; but the same flesh according to number is said to be flesh according to species, insofar as it participates in the form and the properties following from the species; but is said to be matter, insofar as it consists of matter. And that this is the opinion of Aristotle, is clear from the statements of the Commentators who explain things this way, as well as from the recorded words of the Philosopher: for he says that in this way one distinguishes that which is according to species and that which is according to matter in flesh and bone, just as with anything else which has form in matter. But it is the case that such a distinction cannot be made with stone and water, so as to say that there is a part, according to the species, which is derived from those things first generated, and another part according to the matter, which is taken in from nourishment. And thus it is clear that neither in flesh and bone is this to be understood, but rather in the way stated previously; thus the objection proceeds from a poor understanding of the words of the philosopher.

[6174] Ad 3. In regards to the third argument, it must be stated that, according to doctors, the wetness which is contributed by the first generated things, need not be said to be a "radical humor", always remaining distinct according to the matter and property from the wetness which is added from food; but because the natural heat in that humor first stands out, and that which is mixed in, does not participate in the species except by virtue of that humor to which it is mixed in; thus it is like the root of all that which later is converted from food: but not so that either humor, after the end of final digestion, would remain separate; but, the whole being mixed together, it acquires a single

property; and either matter, i.e. that which subsisted under the first humor, and the second which is taken in, are equally related to that which is excreted, and to that which participates in the virtue of the species. But it is not said that the radical humor is consumed when it is separated from such matter, but but the property which the mixed whole has from the virtue of the first humor doe not remain; for then it there cannot be restoration, because the virtue of the species does not remain; just as also if the whole hand is amputated, it is not restored by nourishment, because there does not remain the virtue of the determined species for that organ: and also because of this cause, certain members are said to be composed from the radical humor, not because no nourishment enters into the substance of those members, since any given member of the body grows proportionately; but because the virtue of the species consists principally in those members which are derived from the radical humor; nothing broken off, however, can come to be from them, so that the virtue of the species is not carried off, insofar as it pertains to any given determined part: and for this reason also such members as are cut off are not healed.

[6175] Ad 4. In response to the fourth argument, it must be said that that which comes into the body as added from food will be mixed with that which was prior to it, and similarly one effect will derive from both, thus there will always arise loss proportionately in both; thus it is also necessary that what remains be from both proportionately; and thus it never occurs that all that which existed previously be eliminated, so that none of the prior material would remain; but there will always remain something; and that which is taken in, is one with that which pre-existed, as an effect; and thus there is one matter and one individual for the entirety of life; just as is clear also with fire, which is nourished by logs; for there always remains a fire which is one in number, although some logs are consumed while others are placed alongside: because that which is added, is always made into one thing with that which was there previously; and it would be more similar, if a complete mixture were to occur for the whole, as occurs in nourishment. But it would be otherwise, if, from the matter which comes in, separate fire or flesh were to come to be: for then, according to every sort of diversity of matter, there would also be diversity according to number.

[6176] Ad 5. In response to the fifth argument, it must be stated that that which is generated from nourishment, does not thusly follow perfectly on the nature of the species, as that which is first converted, by the formative virtue, into flesh or bone; then because the first generation was of flesh according to itself, the second however is of flesh in another, as though by mixing together: then also because, inasmuch as the virtue of the soul is more diffused and dispersed, it is rendered more weak; as is clear in regards to the heart, which is less hot the larger it is; thus the animals which have a large heart are naturally timid, as the Philosopher states in Book 13 of "On Animals"; and thus [what is generated from food] is in some way extraneous, and because of this, it is mixed into that which was prior, and is the cause of the weakening of the virtue; just as with water mixed with wine, which the Philosopher gives as an example in Book I of "On Coming to Be"; and thus, finally, it is necessary that shrinking and corruption follow.

[6177] Ad 6. In response to the sixth argument, it must be stated that that mode, i.e. by the multiplication of matter, is not possible, at least for nature; which, as it were, does not make everything by itself, but only according to form, thus it only multiplies form, and not matter: and for this reason, that the work of nature might be served, it was necessary that that mode of growth exist which is appropriate to the virtue of nature.

[6178] Ad 7. In response to the seventh argument, it must be stated that all beings which are of the same species achieve their own perfection in a single way by natural operation. If, nevertheless, one were to achieve it naturally, and another by a miracle, it will not be the same mode: just as when one born blind is given sight by a miracle, whereas in a different manner, another [human] has sight from him who was born seeing. Thus also those who die as children, will achieve their natural quantity by a miracle. But nevertheless it

is not necessary that that miracle be achieved by multiplication of matter, but by the addition of external matter. But those who live to a perfect age, attain to perfect quantity by natural operation. Thus is is not necessary that both occur in the same manner; and were it the same, it would not follow that it came to be by the multiplication of matter.